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ABSTRACT
In major cities around the world, the appetite for better mass transit systems is strong – with
many locations needing to enhance both capacity and coverage to address population
growth and increased transport movement. Available resources from traditional government
sources are limited, however. In this paper, several potential ‘alternative’ project financing
structures will be reviewed – mainly focusing on PPPs – but also briefly taking-in ‘Joint
Powers’ and other arrangements operating under a ‘blended’ financing model.
The paper seeks to analyse and clarify the attributes, pitfalls, and potential benefits of these
different arrangements, drawing on the documentation and stated aims of several recent and
current worldwide exemplars. A literature review and summary case study approach is
adopted - with reference to mainstream sources on mass transit capital financing and
planning. Cross-comparison of the different approaches adopted in various exemplars is
engaged.
The paper then draws interpretation of the wider applicability of these project options for
future mass transit delivery efforts – and touches on the conditions, criteria, and policy
settings under which they might be positioned to deliver effectively.
The paper addresses substantive, current and emerging issues around the ability of transit
stakeholders in growing cities to surpass the limitations of prevailing project financing
cultures and constraints.

Keywords: public transport finance, mass transit project, PPPs, joint powers
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1. INTRODUCTION – END OF THE LINE FOR BUSINESS AS
USUAL
Transport planning and transport infrastructure decisions are proverbially political in nature.
But a different discussion opens-up when researchers step back from the parochial debate
about which projects receive funding in which locations and when. The time may have come
for a more nuanced discussion regarding the options available to accelerate the roll-out of
needed public transport infrastructure.
Certain jurisdictions such as Los Angeles, under their “30-10” rubric seem on the face of it to
have found a solution in which a suite of transport projects is accelerated into delivery (LA
MCTA 2010a; 2010b). It is difficult to identify any negatives around the 30-10 concept. If
anything, one wonders why such approaches are not more widely adopted (politics aside).
Equally we could look at the high-intensity transit environments of East Asia and identify a
commercially-oriented approach that seems to have been remarkably successful in
supporting mass transit infrastructure delivery over an extended period (Cervero & Murakami
2009; Miller & Hale 2011). Again, one may wonder what the drawbacks of these approaches
could possibly be...
In Australia and the UK, however, and to some degree in the United States, any discussion
around project financing innovation for public transport seems to leap immediately and
heroically into an assumption that public private partnerships (PPPs) are the only option
worth considering (see RTD 2007; IPA 2012). Indeed, project documentation from the Gold
Coast Rapid Transit project recently suggested, tautologically, that the PPP methodology
was chosen because;
“...all three levels of government felt a strong obligation to develop a delivery method which
would meet the desires of the market for a large Public Private Partership (PPP).”
(GCRT 2011, p28)
PPPs seem to work to a degree in fields such as water and energy supply, or in toll road
projects, although outcomes are mixed there at best for investors. But the track record in
public transport is thin. Review of recent literature (admittedly primarily industry-written,
rather than academic) would even suggest a certain level of crudeness in the PPP
intellectual space – in which the concepts of “transport projects” and/or “road projects” are
confused (see IPA 2012, p13; PWC 2011). The transport-related capital investment PPPs
delivered so-far (in Australia at least) are overwhelmingly road projects. Hence it may be time
for PPP scholars and participants to use more specific and nuanced language – and talk
about “road PPPs” when that is what they mean, rather than “transport infrastructure PPPs” –
which tends to imply a degree of inter-changeability that is not reflected in the mix of actual
delivered projects, nor in the specific skills needed in different types of transport project.
In that sense, this paper offers opportunity for critical review of the role that PPPs are playing
very specifically in public transport infrastructure delivery – and this is done primarily through
appraisal of recent literature, and through a consolidated listing of recognised public
transport PPPs. For despite the meagre representation of mass transit in the overall set of
transport-related private finance projects, recent years do seem to have seen a certain
threshold crossed – and a small but possibly critical mass of public transport PPPs have
been transacted, implemented, or put out to tender (at the time of writing).
In short - public transport researchers can no longer ignore the idea of transit PPPs – and
their future is something of an open book.
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Table 1. Selected Contemporary Transit PPPs & Innovative Projects:
Asia-Pacific & North America
Project

Location

Reported
Value
($US at 2012)

Major
Private
Investor

% private
capital

Project type &
commentary

Timing

KL Central
Stationi

Kuala
Lumpur,
Malaysia

$184m

Malaysian
Resources
Corp.

64%

Major station
facilities & TOD
project. Build,
operate, transfer

Transaction
2000. Opened
2001

Southern
Cross
Stationii

Melbourne,
VIC

$309m
(NPV)*

Civic Nexus

100%

Iconic urban
station
interchange.
Design-B-O-T

Contract 2002,
completed
2006. 30 year
mgt term.

Shenzhen
Subway
Line 4iii

Guangdong
Province
(Southern
China)

$733m

HK MTR Corp.

100%

B-O-T. 15
stations. “Classic
east-Asian metro
rail” configuration.
Direct negotiation
process.

Transaction
2005,
Opened 2011,
transfer 2035

Beijing
Subway
Line 4iv

Beijing City

$577m

HK MTR Corp.

49%

Transaction
2006,
Opened 2009,
transfer 2036

Transbay
Terminalv

San
Francisco, CA

$4.2b

nil

Eagle P3
Projectvi

Denver, CO

$2.185b

Private N/A.
Transbay Joint
Powers
Authority
Denver Transit
Partners
(consortium)

Waratah

Sydney, NSW

$3.6b

Reliance Rail
(consortium)

~ 100%

B-O-T. 24
stations. “Classic
east-Asian metro
rail” configuration.
Competitive
tender.
Major station
facilities & TOD
project. Joint
Powers Authority
Light & heavy rail
expansion PPP.
Incl. design, build,
infrastructure &
rolling stock.
Operate on
availability basis
Heavy rail rolling
stock – design,
build, maintain 78
trains (&
maintenance
facility)

GoldLinq
(consortium)

100%.
Construct &
avail.
payments
from local,
state &
national govt
50%

Around 50%

(AUD)vii

Gold Coast
Light Rail –
phase 1

Gold Coast,
QLD

Manila LRT
Line 1xi
Northwest
Rail Linkxii

Manila

$949m
(AUD)

Sydney
metropolitan
region, NSW

ix

$1.25b

TBA

“optimal
combination”
sought. Avail.
payments
from State
govt

TBA

TBA

notes: *total amount debated; ** agreement term is poorly documented
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Light rail – design,
build, operate.
Availability
payments.

Light rail
extension – build,
operate, maintain
Heavy rail –
operations,
maintenance &
rolling stock.
Competitive
tender

Transaction
2003. Expected
full completion
2017
RFQ 2008,
transaction
2010, 50 year
build/operate
period (?)**

Contract date
2006. Specify
operate 2013 –
2043viii
Program
slippage has
occurred.
Franchisee
appointed May
2011.
Operation
commence due
2014, till 2029x
Tender late
2012
Tender early
2013.
10-15 year
contract likely
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First steps into greater engagement with the potential of public transport PPPs are taken in
Table 1 – which summarises a selection of mainstream contemporary projects, alongside a
San Francisco project also considered “innovative” (but not a PPP, as such). A researcher
interested in public transport projects is perhaps compelled by this listing of exemplars to
countenance and engage with the idea of PPPs emerging as a mainstream transit
infrastructure delivery model. An imperative arises to grapple in earnest with transit PPPs, to
understand their strengths, weaknesses and nuances, and to engage in constructive
communication, dialogue and analysis with the aim of improving practice and understanding
(suggested also in Shaoul et al 2012).
From this listing of recent projects (in Table 1.), one set of issues and challenges appears to
revolve around engineering design and transit system performance focus (or project
scope). Another set of imperatives seems to arise from the once-off transaction or up-front
contract arrangement (and the manner in which that agreement is then monitored and
repositioned over the longer-run). This is related to another set of needs and demands
around the medium and longer-term operations and business goals of the transit project
or partnership (as distinct from the purely contractual treatment of such).
Stepping back, one dares to suggest that a water or energy supply PPP might be more easily
defined... or possibly has fewer ‘parameters’. They assume perhaps a certain quantum of
energy or water supply, at a certain quality or specification, delivered to certain locations over
an agreed time horizon, in return for certain payments. When we come to public transport
movements, however, the changing and inherently variable demands of passengers and
local residents seems to add an entire additional layer of complexity and “noisiness” in
operational and contract terms (see ‘traditional’ transit infrastructure sources such as Vuchic
2005; 2007; Mees 2010; DfT 2011; Hale 2011a). Some PPP experts may be willing to argue
that energy, water and/or roads are equally “people-defined”, but at this stage of the paper it
seems worth raising the possibility that a public transport PPP is another type of PPP entirely
– and quite possibly a more difficult and challenging variant. This seems to connect again
with the curious industry-readiness to engage in discussion of “transport PPPs” (see IPA
2012; PWC 2011) while studiously skirting the more specific topic of public transport PPPs.
In this paper (via table 1 as a starting point, and then in Part 4) we also bring in an emergent
analysis of project arrangements one step beyond the narrow industry-accepted definition of
“a PPP”. All kinds of projects invariably involve partnerships, and invariably they involve a
cast of public and private entities. But the emphasis in certain other emerging models (joint
powers arrangements, for example) may well extend relatively effortlessly beyond the
transactional, and connect with medium and longer-term city building and public transport
ridership objectives (see Miller & Hale 2011 for contextual discussion). We also briefly (in
Part 2.) refer back to the pros-and-cons of ‘traditional procurement’ approaches for the
delivery of transit infrastructure enhancement. Undoubtedly these will continue to be utilised
– and any shift toward PPPs needs to demonstrate an addressing of the pros involved in
traditional methods, and some bettering of the cons. Part 3 offers the primary engagement
with mainstream options for public transport PPP.
From review of these options and arrangements one thing seems to be emerging clearly
even at this early stage... The immediate and longer-term future of mass transit projects and
financing in the USA or Australia (in particular) is unlikely to be the same as the previous 20
years. The paper discusses a list of ‘reasons’ and strategic realities that clarify this new
juncture in transit project approaches.
In project financing for mass transit, we seem to have reached the end of the line for
business as usual.
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2. REFLECTIONS ON TRADITIONAL TRANSIT
INFRASTRUCTURE PROCUREMENT
Depending on our assessment criteria, ‘traditional procurement’ could either be seen as the
method most oriented to the public interest, or the method that is least likely to deliver
substantial quanta of new infrastructure in a given city over a given period. Hodge & Duffield
(2010, ch17) paint a picture of the long-term industry circumstances that contextualised evergreater movement away from ‘traditional’ procurement, into PPP/PFI and related forms.
The pros of traditional approaches revolve around the ability of government agencies to plan
and procure infrastructure that is entirely fit-for-purpose, and scoped to address the needs of
future users. Mainstream ideas of the ‘proper method for planning rail transport projects’ tend
to describe the same process that occurs under traditional procurement and agency-side
project management (see Profillidis 2006, p112) - rather than the course of pre-construction
events that is described in PPP literature or practice. The focus in this approach would
appear to be more firmly oriented on the operation of the infrastructure once-complete. A
‘traditional’ procurement of some section of mass transit infrastructure is a sub-set of the
operationally-focussed activities of a transit agency or government transport stakeholder.
The question of contracts and transactions is not merely lesser-order, under this traditional
thinking - they become almost invisible as issues. The procuring stakeholder is seen as
managing and operating mass transit day-to-day, and then occasionally it steps outside of
that immediate-term focus to design and deliver something that presumably meets a
recognised (and/or estimated) need into the future.
The cons of this mode of endeavour, however, are also clearly evident - and a range of
stakeholders and commentators remind us of these regularly. Cost over-runs have been
nominated as public enemy number one in mass transit (Flyvbjerg et al 2004; Raisbeck et al
2010). Analyses of this issue have not always clarified the difference between variation from
early-stage cost-estimates, on the one hand – as opposed to any variation between contract
cost and end cost. The latter form of variance is based on clearer scope, and tends to be
subject to much smaller, if still notable, cost over-runs.
Disconnect between the focus of design-construct actors and end-operators has also been
raised as an issue with traditional transit infrastructure procurement (Duffield 2010, p194).
And in a sense, PPPs and related policy directions are of themselves something of a critique
of traditional methods. Acceptance of this critique seems to revolve very much around
acceptance of the proposition that government or public sector actors are inefficient, and that
private sector actors are inherently more efficient and creative (see Shaoul et al 2012 for
nuanced discussion). This theme recurs in almost any project or policy-level discourse
around the move toward PPPs in the Anglo world and beyond (summarised in Hodge &
Duffield 2010, p400-401; RTD 2007). Indeed, it would be a brave or foolhardy commentator
who stood on a soapbox to argue in favour of the productivity, efficiency, creativity or
flexibility of public sector actors or Anglosphere transit agencies. On the other hand, the
availability of clear benchmarking of relative private vs public sector labour or project
efficiency is certainly nowhere near the level of the rhetorical or assertive emphasis that this
topic receives (as per IPA 2012). At an anecdotal level, this particular researcher – who has
worked alongside actors from both sectors – is not clear that employees of large private
sector organisations such as consultancies are inherently “better” or “more productive” than
their equivalents in slightly larger public sector organisations. Department for Transport, UK
(2011) presents confounding evidence on this very topic, with the privatised, consultantdependent UK rail sector benchmarked as clearly less efficient than the more ‘public’, less
consultant-reliant continental equivalent:
th
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“The industry also has weaknesses in ...management which have allowed excessive wage
drift, at all levels, and the continuation of inefficient work practices.” (DfT 2011, p10)
A recent contribution from Shaoul et al (2012) seems to crystallise this problem of an
assumption toward comparative private-sector efficiency that is not based on clear
supporting evidence – at least in the UK transport context.

The crux – not enough public transport infrastructure delivery...
The one issue or critique around ‘traditional’ public sector transit infrastructure procurement
in the Anglosphere (Australia, USA, UK perhaps) that this researcher is certain of surrounds
the weak track record of system build-out over the past generation, relative to the equivalent
level of investment and network expansion that has occurred in European or East Asian
jurisdictions. Although, at the same time, it needs to be recognised that the European and
Asian transit infrastructure build-out has not necessarily been a resounding demonstration of
the absolute necessity of strict PPP-style approaches, per se (see Cervero & Murakami;
Bratzel 1999; Peters 2010; Tang & Lo 2010).
In these contexts, a clamour has arisen for new methods and options beyond ‘traditional’
procurement (Miller & Hale 2011; Hale 2011a; DfT 2012; Brookings Institution &
Reconnecting America 2009; US GAO 2010). A number of the alternative options addressed
in these sources are not PPPs. And this nascent enquiry into new, innovative and alternative
project financing and implementation options appears to be a somewhat different line of
enquiry to the leap-of-faith sometimes displayed in connecting lack of projects with PPPs as
the only option worth considering (see Shaoul et al 2012). As an example of the more rigidly
PPP-focused thinking, Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (2012) recently spoke in one
paragraph of needing to adopt an ‘agnostic’ approach to the selection of delivery methods on
a project-by-project basis, before daringly suggesting that PPPs would be the most likely
approach (under this ‘agnostic’ selection of options):
“The private sector already plays an important role in the delivery of publicly funded transport
projects. However given the existing funding constraints and the inherent value of private
sector risk transfer and innovation, it is sensible that the Government consider a greater role
for the private sector in delivering and maintaining new transport infrastructure through Public
Private Partnerships.” (IPA 2012, p18)
IPA did not, at that point, nor elsewhere in their document, comprehensively or clearly
document or benchmark any evidence of actual and/or observable “...inherent value of
private sector risk transfer or innovation...”
The literature, the observable reality, and the IPA document for that matter, all generally
affirm that time has come for a new look at a range of options outside of traditional
procurement for mass transit. PPPs could well be one of these methods, but we would
invariably want to cast the net reasonably wide to countenance a full range of possibilities. If
PPPs do indeed emerge as the logical solution to public transport under-investment, then
few would argue with that outcome. But equally, it could be that revitalisation of traditional
procurement strategies is part of the solution (and a certain amount of research and policy
literature does indeed venture in this direction). Stakeholders are also increasingly interested
to learn about any other options (outside of PPPs or traditional procurement) that hold
promise for greater levels of transit project delivery (see Transport for NSW 2012, ch10).
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3. TWO SORTS OF TRANSIT PPP
In this section, two core public transport PPP options or types are reviewed. These are
consolidated from the salient attributes of the exemplar projects detailed in Table 1. and
themed into “availability-based” and “revenue-oriented” transit PPPs.
Availability-based PPPs
In an availability-based PPP for public transport, the transaction (presumably) does not
reference ridership or farebox revenue realities to any significant degree. It may be
suggested from the outset that this arrangement is probably the most “certain” from the
private provider’s point of view and involves a greater level of risk-adoption from the public or
government side to the transaction. The four exemplars listed in table 1. (Eagle P3, GCLR
phase one, NWRL, and Waratah) offer interesting interpretive opportunities.
Denver’s Eagle
Eagle P3 appears to be based on the design and construction or upgrade (among other
activities) of light and heavy rail corridors, and the running of vehicles up-and-down the
corridor by some formula or agreed arrangement (RTD 2011; RTD & Denver Transit Partners
2010; RTD 2008). An obvious counter-point to the procuring agency’s enthusiasm for this
arrangement is that it seemingly renders the operator oblivious to the ridership and
passenger-growth opportunities associated with rail service. Undoubtedly, this Denver
corridor is presumed in the documentation to be a loss-making, heavily subsidised operation.
But one would need to question the degree to which the transaction arrangement and the
discussion in the documentation either presumes or perhaps reinforces that outcome... This
researcher’s appraisal would also suggest that the ridership-oblivious nature of Eagle P3 has
become apparent in its actual design and engineering. The project designs and fly-throughs
seem to suggest light and heavy rail corridors that are:
a) Lacking in connectedness and reference to any substantial set of obvious local-scale
activity generators or ridership catchments
b) Lacking integration to surrounding street networks. There appears to be no “structure
plan” for the station areas as understood in the contemporary urban design literature
or discussion (refer GCCC 2011 for contrast)
c) Not embracing of contemporary notions around station-area TOD
d) Predicated almost entirely on park-and-ride as the only access mechanism or
infrastructure. Access by pedestrians, cyclists or bus feeder does not appear to be
countenanced to any great degree – despite the important role these modal options
play in most successful international rail-based transit offerings (see Hale 2011b)
While not wishing to be overly negative about the Eagle P3 project or its proponents – this
project exemplar could serve to alert other public transport financing stakeholders further
abroad to the sorts of engineering and design outcomes that may well be a logical result of a
PPP that does not reference ridership or ticket revenue-related goals. Eagle’s documentation
also seems to express a transaction focus throughout, and this seems to be problematic for
any longer-term strategic outcome (see RTD 2011, esp parts 1-2).
Gold Coast Light Rail – Phase one (GCLR)
The Gold Coast project, which involves construction and operations on an availability basis,
(similar, in passing, to Eagle) seemingly differs from the Denver project substantially via its
greater resourcing and development of an initial reference case design, prior to the
solicitation of bids (see GCRT 2011; GCCC 2011). This renders the winning bidder
responsible for detailed engineering design and then construction and delivery within more
th
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clearly-developed and articulated corridor and performance parameters. These parameters
have included emphasis on interacting with and enhancing the urban corridor through “city
building” philosophies. In practicality, the scope of actual transit-supportive urban design
infrastructure intervention via the GCLR project itself is relatively limited – but at the very
least these outcomes are not precluded by the chosen design (GCRT 2011; GCCC 2011).
The GCLR approach seems useful, in offering the idea that state and local government
agencies would work together for a city-responsive, land-use responsive rail project
outcome, with private sector innovation narrowed-down into still-challenging aspects such as
rolling stock delivery, detailed engineering, and operational efficiency. Eagle’s procurers, by
contrast, have placed great store in the “flexibility” and opportunities for “creativity” that a less
proscriptive design approach implies. They nominate a project saving of some $300m as
evidence of this value – although have not clearly demonstrated to the reader of their
“lessons learned” document (RTD 2011) that this is an efficiency rather than a de-scoping
outcome. Any confusion between productivity, innovation and efficiency on the one hand,
and de-scoping (which is quite a different thing) on the other should be assiduously avoided
in project contexts.
“It is recommended that future projects similarly invest significant resources upfront into the
development of the reference design.” (GCLR 2011, p35)
On the other hand, GCLR seems to share Eagle’s lack of connectedness to any sense of a
clear ridership growth or revenue incentive package – and this could be viewed as a problem
in itself.
North West Rail Link (NWRL) - Sydney
The NWRL exemplar is interesting because it steps back completely from the idea
(expressed via Eagle and GCLR) of fully-integrating infrastructure design, delivery,
construction, and passenger operations (see Transport for NSW 2012a). NWRL’s main PPP
play is “rolling stock supply and rail operations”. And there has been some advancement of
the idea that the large overall NWRL corridor development is better placed (from
Government’s perspective) when broken into manageable chunks (Transport for NSW
2012a, p12-15). In practice this has meant separating “rolling stock and operations” from two
traditionally-procured design-construction elements (at-grade and underground corridor
respectively) and a preparatory civil works contract. Perhaps, harsh lessons from NWRL’s
very different rolling stock PPP predecessor (Waratah) have focused NSW government
minds on the necessity of risk-mitigation for large-scale transport works. This realistic
approach to risk, and the sensible idea of breaking a large project into manageable
components seem to run counter to many anecdotally-expressed hopes that PPPs would
provide a mega-scale feeding frenzy for the corporate sector.
“The PPP will ...ensure ...appropriate balance of risk transfer with the optimal combination of
private sector financing and State contribution.” (Transport for NSW 2011a, p15)
Fare revenue and ridership are again treated agnostically in the NWRL concept. The project
is pitched as a PPP (which it is), but documentation is clear that funding ultimately comes
entirely from state government consolidated revenue (see Transport for NSW 2011a, p15).

Waratah
Any lessons for future projects arising from Sydney’s Waratah rolling stock delivery and
leasing project are not clear-cut - but they do seem to speak to possible pitfalls for PPPs
where the private-side actor is not tied into any sense of the demands that large daily
passenger volumes place on transit agencies. The “costs” of project delay are undoubtedly
huge for an agency such as RailCorp, and its elected overseers (see Saulwick 2011;
th
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RailCorp 2012, p7). The public narrative of Waratah has revolved around manufacturing
integration problems leading to timing and cost over-runs. There appears to be another
emergent narrative of the sponsoring government being, in reality, the last port-of-call and
the ultimate guarantor of project risk where and as the private-side partner comes into
project-related problems (see AAP 2012). It is not clear that this scenario is specific only to
the “availability” PPP model, but it does again indicate that this particular variant carries
significant sponsor-side risk potential. Waratah stands notable as one of the largest public
transport PPPs in Australian or recent international experience (see Table 1.) – and also for
its status as one of the larger PPPs of any type ever executed in Australia (Hodge & Duffield
2010, p410). This “risk” dynamic belies the common anecdotal (rather than evidence-based)
storyline that moving toward PPPs invariably involves a useful “shifting of risk to those
parties in a best position to bear it...” Another, blunter interpretation might simply be that the
public sector is the party most able to bear large-scale risk in large-scale public works
projects (see Hodge & Duffield 2010, p405).
Revenue-oriented transit PPP exemplars
A revenue-oriented public transport PPP would appear to be one that does incorporate some
level of ridership and farebox, or other revenue risk - and upside opportunity.
The discussion on public transport planning, financing and operations tends to suggest quite
clearly that transit agencies are best placed where they roll up their sleeves and proactively
chase ridership growth, and improved farebox position over time (Vuchic 2005, ch7-9;
Walker 2008; DfT 2011; Transport for NSW 2012b, ch10). One can only assume that this
dictum would follow-through into a transit PPP design-build-operate scenario or similar.
Undoubtedly any interpretation of the value of “chasing ridership” is complicated by the split
between profitable East Asian rail companies, and subsidised European, US and Australian
counterparts. Although this particular researcher’s view suggests that the more successful of
European and US players (say; Munich MVV, Transport for London; BART; Washington
DC’s WMATA) all tend to see reasonably robust farebox recovery, correspondingly low levels
of subsidy (comparatively speaking) and some documented sense of being in a strategic,
tactical and marketing-based “hunt for passengers” over time (Hale 2011a). The outstanding
revenue position of the East Asian industry also seems in large part a function of their
revenue-focused strategic paradigm (see HK MTR 2011). Train tickets do not sell
themselves, to be sure...
The passenger rail industry in Australia is a) quite robust in passenger volume terms (BITRE
2012), but b) exceedingly heavily subsidised (Hale 2011a), and c) traditionally somewhat
averse to proactive ridership growth goals or revenue-consolidation strategies. In this sense,
Australia operators such as Metro Trains Melbourne (part-owned by Hong Kong MTR) or
Queensland Rail (a service-contracted government-owned corporation) appear to be stuck in
a cash-for-train-movements scenario, which is revenue and ridership-agnostic. As an
example - during 2011-12 Queensland Rail slightly increased its revenues, primarily from
government transfer, against a slight fall in ridership (Queensland Rail 2012).
At face value (and being forgiving about the lack of readily-available project and partnership
details) there seem to be useful transit PPP reference cases emerging via the Asian mass
transit project examples (see Table 1.) - including the Beijing and Shenzhen metro lines (the
latter of which the researcher has experienced first-hand) and presumably the emerging
Manila LRT 1 corridor and transaction. Of the Shenzhen exemplar, an observer can at least
say (in contrast to the Denver Eagle P3 project) that it is built and positioned to handle large
numbers of passengers in a ‘traditional’ mass transit format that is closely integrated with
land use and ridership generation clusters. The Manila example is also scant in terms of
publically-available information. But details which do emerge speak of a high-volume
corridor, at an affordable construction cost (around $US 62.5m per km), where ridership and
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revenue are positioned for presumed operating profitability (the currently operational section
is quoted at a farebox ratio of 1.45) (LRTA and Department of Transport & Communications
2012). This is clearly a mass transit business exercise in the fullest sense – where design,
engineering, operations and marketing will presumably be positioned around optimising
revenue against cost through ridership growth and volume. Customer-service orientation is
likely to be reasonably robust in this context. The Manila model is also notable in seemingly
countenancing a 50/50 government/private project cost arrangement. Whether this is a
potential equity arrangement is not clear – but the possibility does not seem precluded. More
problematic is the documentation’s suggestion that “highest concession fee” is the key
financial criteria for bid selection. It is not entirely clear that this is the logical first priority in a
public interest setting, where infrastructure and operations plays a cornerstone role in urban
structure and movement. The established literature would suggest a large variety of
alternative and competing economic, financial and functional criteria for mass transit beyond
direct payments to government (see Vuchic 2005; Mees 2010; Cervero 1998). At the very
least one wonders what such payments to government (arising from a mass transit PPP)
could possibly be employed for, if not for improving the experience of public transport users
and the position of transit infrastructure in Manila... If these are to be priorities, then the
importance of a payment to government becomes unclear or problematic in a PPP-bid
scenario.
Summary of two pathways
One is drawn to the depth of information and pre-planning that appears to have been
employed in the GCLR exemplar – which tends to set a standard via a medium-term program
in which broader transport planning imperatives feed into a transit PPP design-constructoperate contract. GCLR appears to have produced sensible system design outcomes and
future city-building opportunities, via a solid concept development process accompanied by
reasonably open documentation. Less clear is the longer-term relationship between Goldlinq
as operator, and its passenger market. Eagle, by contrast, appears to have been excessively
contract or transaction-focused at the expense of mainstream public transport goals (such as
ridership and city-shaping).
The revenue-oriented PPP option seems at first glance relevant mainly to Asian conditions of
high passenger volume and a liquid operating finance position in mass transit. But on the
other hand, it is not conceptually or logically clear that ridership targets and ridership
risk/opportunity could not be built into a transit PPP arrangement in an Australian or US
context... The UK’s privatisation history has proven confounding – with subsidies seemingly
growing at a faster rate than ridership (Shaoul et al 2012). Perhaps the ultimate path forward
for PPPs as a transit implementation option revolves around a maturing of the market’s
willingness to engage with ridership risk.
Risk more broadly is, as expected, clearly present as a core topic throughout the listed
exemplars. Whether in a stations context (at Southern Cross) or in rolling stock availability
(Waratah) – large project cost over-runs involve a burdening of either private or public
stakeholders with the logical outcomes of demanding risk guarantor roles. In Southern Cross,
the private sector largely bore the brunt, while in Waratah, public stakeholders became the
ultimate port-of-call when cost escalation exceeded the private guarantor’s ability to cope
(regardless of intentions in contract). An overall appraisal might tend to suggest that largescale risk-shifting to the private sector, on the balance of probability, is not as applicable a
rationale for transit PPPs as first-generation PPP proponents might have suggested (for
discussion see Wilson et al 2010; Raisbeck et al 2010, p346; Shaoul et al 2012).

th

13 WCTR, July 2013 – Rio, Brazil

10

Mass Transit Project Financing – new and alternative approaches
HALE, Chris

4. BEYOND PPP - JOINT POWERS AUTHORITIES AND OTHER
‘BLENDED FINANCING’ EXAMPLES
International experience would tend to suggest another set of emergent “non-mainstream”
project approaches that bring together various public sector stakeholders around commercial
revenue streams in a transit infrastructure setting. For want of a better terminology, these will
be referred to below interchangeably as “Joint Powers” and/or “blended financing” options
and models.

Great promise, few exemplars...
The leading exemplar of the “joint powers” project type, and one of very few that reaches
genuine scale, would appear to be San Francisco’s Transbay Terminal project (see TJPA
2011a; SFRA 2011). In this instance, a list of reasonably diverse public sector agencies
combine their interests in development of a specific facility via a special purpose
arrangement that also addresses commercial revenue (primarily in the form of real estate
development), and which incorporates mainstream project borrowing. In short, multiple
government revenue and borrowing streams are incorporated (TJPA 2011b).
The reason for including this particular model, given its lack of broad track record or any
wide-ranging industry support seems to be the almost unassailable logic of combining
various interests into an equity-based arrangement - which opens the possibility of
commercial revenues and commercial returns in a public transit infrastructure context.
The Los Angeles 30-10 plan (LACMTA 2010a; 2010b), while not immediately or obviously
connected to the Transbay Terminal example, will also be listed in this paper because of its
status as an innovative project suite (or project approach) in its own right. Its point of
commonality with Transbay may well be the idea that a fit-for-purpose project arrangement
should be created - rather than mobilising an off-the-shelf project typology in search of a
project (as the PPP option often seems to be, in its public transport incarnations). For the
purposes of this paper we will apply a “blended finance” label to LA 30-10 (and by
implication, to other projects that may emerge under this approach or typology).
LA 30-10 combines quite a wide array of funding streams and folds them into project-level
financing and implementation packages. The strengths of this “blended finance” approach
seem to revolve around flexibility, openness, and the willingness to source and utilise
multiple funding streams with the aim of leveraging and accelerating implementation with the
assistance of project-level borrowing. So many mass transit infrastructure projects, especially
in Australia, tend toward the assumption of only one or two sources of go-or-no-go public
sector funds - and when this fails a “lack of money” is invariably blamed and bemoaned. The
alternative then seems to be “a PPP” – although proponents seldom spell-out the user-pays
or consolidated-revenue regime presumably required to back any availability payments.
This researcher would judge the “blended” model likely to achieve certain levels of
awareness and interest in years to come, with stakeholders perhaps watching LA 30-10 for
signs of success, failure, re-applicability, or otherwise. Equally, the “joint powers” model
offered by Transbay seems likely to emerge as a concept that increasingly competes with
PPPs as an implementation packaging option. These are predicated around ideas of value
capture – a topic receiving ever-increasing attention (see Transport for NSW 2012b, ch10;
Miller & Hale 2011; US GAO 2010). These models also seem to connect meaningfully with
the concept of “institutional PPPs” as a more business-like, equity-based, multi-partner
arrangement (see Duffield 2010, p187).
th

13 WCTR, July 2013 – Rio, Brazil

11

Mass Transit Project Financing – new and alternative approaches
HALE, Chris

5. CONCLUSIONS – FLEXIBILITY, OPENNESS AND
PASSENGER EXPERIENCE AS CRITERIA FOR FUTURE FOCUS
“Governance in its broadest sense is very strategic and involves rules about behaviours that
we wish to have exhibited in our society. It is not just about profit maximisation. It is, for
example, truthfulness, fairness, transparency, probity and integrity in how we achieve a
stable, healthy society in the fullest sense ...” (Wilson et al 2010, p201)
In this concluding section we briefly re-summarise and re-appraise the value and applicability
of various PPP approaches and the other identified project resourcing options.
With PPPs, an initial issue tends to emerge in scoping – around whether a reasonably clear
corridor reference design is important, or not. A further set of issues seem then to revolve
around whether an immediate-horizon contract or transaction is the focus, or whether longerterm contingencies and partnerships are the goal. Both of these questions come together in
the choice, if one exists, between pursuing a revenue-oriented or revenue-agnostic and
availability-based PPP option.
The obsessive transaction emphasis of many PPP exercises should be debated more
vigorously. With transit being a people-focused, complex and challenging set of activities, it
seems almost impossible that any given PPP contract could ever cover the full range of
contingencies, changed circumstances, demand fluctuations, and new scenarios that emerge
over, say, a 20 year contract period (Shaoul et al 2012). In this sense, this researcher is
highly critical of the idea that a public transport PPP “works” as an outcome of initial contract
negotiation, on the basis of rigid up-and-down-the-line movement of vehicles. The basic need
for flexibility over time does not seem to be addressed in many pre-existing transit PPPs.
Regarding the two different PPP orientations for public transport, one can only presume that
a revenue-oriented model is “better” - in so far as it connects with the established body of
literature, understanding and practice that focuses on ridership growth and revenue
optimisation as necessary elements in mass transit success. This is inter-related to the need
for customer-service orientation, and close integration with passenger catchments and
markets - whether through urban design and station facilities, network integration, or other
mechanisms.
There are two counter-points to the “revenue-oriented” PPP approach – one obvious, one
less-so. Firstly, many commentators would undoubtedly point to the subsidised nature of
mass transit operations in the USA, Europe or Australia and suggest that a ticket revenue or
ridership focused transit PPP is inherently non-applicable in their jurisdiction. But any such
presumption would be incorrect – in that corporatized or privatised passenger operations
such as Queensland Rail or Metro Trains Melbourne actually run on a commercial profitmargin basis. Government simply guarantees their organisational operating margin via an
effective subsidy whereby the cost of running trains over and above ticket sales is covered.
So – in these instances, a private/corporate arrangement is profitable for the private or
corporate franchisee, despite the subsidised nature of Australian mass transit. This particular
researcher has often engaged in discussion with localised transit stakeholders around the
problem of Metro Trains and/or Queensland Rail being almost entirely reduced to a trainmovement focus, with only the most opaque and vague connection between ridership growth
and organisational incentive. Undoubtedly though, ridership-cultivation and customer service
are difficult challenges. It is quite possible that the corporate sector prefers to move trains upand-down the line while receiving a guaranteed margin for that activity – rather than
engaging with the messy question of actually competing against private vehicles for travellers
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in order to define organisational success or failure. Perhaps this “lack of interest” in moving
into a contested transport market is the second, and possibly the most influential reason why
the corporate sector tends to push an availability model where transit PPPs or other
privatised scenarios are envisaged.

Table 2. Criteria for Adopting Emergent Transit Project
Financing Approaches
– as proffered in a variety of sources

Unconvincing Criteria
“PPPs because the market demands one”
“PPPs because the private sector is inherently better”
“Unless there is a PPP, it won’t get built”
“If investors go broke – the public gets free infrastructure”
Payments to government as primary bid criteria
De-scoping of project presented as ‘efficiency’ dividend
Hand-over detailed project planning to consortium - to relieve
public sector burden of involvement in planning
‘Risk transfer’ from public to private actors
‘Off balance sheet’ capital investment option (for governments)
Convincing & Valid Criteria
Selection of the most cost-effective option (regardless of model)
Selecting a financing option in line with orderly ongoing capital
investment programs
Selecting option that optimises project scope or system
performance
Maximising transit ridership or usage
Optimising value and impact of available subsidy and resources
Maximising ticket revenues
Effective land use integration & urban design outcomes
Better facilities for passengers
Improved overall level-of-service
Flexibility over time
Creating private and public sector capital investment opportunities
that support agreed strategic goals over time (e.g.- mode share,
ridership, system expansion)
Transparency & accountability
The public interest

Another major challenge lies in the fields of openness, transparency, governance and
transport organisational cultures. Reading through the documentation from our exemplars, it
became clear that certain project participants were at pains to communicate and address
their “lessons learned” to industry (rather than to the public or taxpayers). Perhaps they are
touting for future work – because the documents often read that way to this reviewer. On the
whole, PPPs (and our listed transit project exemplars to some degree) seem to exist in a
continuum of confidentiality and even secrecy that does not appear to be justified by the
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pretext of “commerciality”. Taxpayer funds are taxpayer funds - and while initial negotiation
and the proposals of non-successful bidders should remain “commercial in-confidence”,
there appears to be no valid reason for avoiding full disclosure and clarity of the
arrangements between taxpayers and their corporate PPP servants. In Australia, this reality
is at least partially recognised in the public posting of major Metro Trains Melbourne
contracts. In summary, a full maturing of the transit PPP as an implementation option can
probably only arise alongside a maturing of corporate and government posture toward
project openness and transparency.
Final points surround the important role “joint powers” and “blended finance” models will
likely play in transit infrastructure delivery in years to come. The PPP option has been framed
as a choice between “traditional” design-construct procurement and a corporate-led
revolution in infrastructure efficiency and productivity (via PPPs which paradoxically carry
massive financing and transactional costs). An objective appraisal might conclude, by
contrast, that there are actually three basic pathways now open to public transport
stakeholders. They can: procure traditionally; pursue PPP options; or compare both of these
to a commercially-driven joint powers arrangement that mixes multiple sources of public
sector funding and equity, closely matched to community and stakeholder needs across a
range of fronts.
And herein lies the shock of the new for PPP-proponents. Just as the PPP model reaches a
certain level of formative maturity in public transport contexts, another option – perhaps more
flexible – emerges to compete for attention.
In the discussion of public transport project options, we have definitely reached the end of
the line for business as usual...

Figure 1 – Former Transbay Terminal in San Francisco – an unlikely launching pad for a 21st
century mass transit financing revolution...? (author 2008)
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